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Kamm on the Morality of Killing* 
Michael Otsuka 
The second volume of Frances Kamm's Morality, Mortality provides the 
sustained and compelling answers of a deontologist to three questions 
involving the morality of killing that have been central to substantive 
ethics in the last twenty-five years. The first is whether there is a 
genuine moral distinction between killing and letting die. The second 
is whether there is any principled way to account for strongly held 
but seemingly conflicting intuitions about the permissibility of killing 
some and saving others in much discussed cases involving runaway 
trolleys, killing to obtain vital organs, and the like. The third is whether 
one can supply a justification of a deontological constraint against 
killing even though the violation of this constraint would prevent more 
of the same type of constraint from being violated. Kamm's affirmative 
answers to these questions will be familiar to those who have read her 
earlier articles on these topics. Nevertheless, the book greatly expands 
and revises her previous work and contains much new material. 
I. KILLING VERSUS LETTING DIE 
Part 1 is devoted primarily to the rejection of the claim that killing 
and letting die are morally equivalent. Philosophers who believe that 
killing and letting die are morally equivalent are notorious for arguing 
in the following manner. They select a pair of cases that are thought 
to differ in no respect except that the one involves a killing and the 
other involves a letting die and of which it is thought to be intuitively 
clear that the killing is morally on a par with the letting die. From this 
they conclude that, other things equal, killing is morally on a par with 
letting die. Many (including Kamm) have noted the obvious fallacy in 
this type of argument: one cannot move from the claim that there is 
a single case in which, other things equal, a killing is on a par with a 
* A review essay of Frances M. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, vol. 2, Rights, Duties, and 
Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). I would like to thank Timothy Hall, 
Frances Kamm, and Seana Shiffrin for their comments on earlier drafts of this review. 
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letting die to the claim that killing is on a par with letting die in every 
case in which other things are equal. 
Kamm reveals a deeper problem with some of the arguments 
meant to establish that killing is equivalent to letting die.' She notes 
that some pairs of cases of killings and settings die appear to be morally 
on a par because that which is true by definition of a killing (or letting 
die) is also contingently true of the letting die (or killing) in this particu- 
lar comparison. Consider the following illustration of this claim. It is 
(Kamm maintains) true by definition of 'letting die' that if I let you 
die, then you lose only your life that you would have had by virtue 
of my aid. It is not, on the other hand, true by definition of 'killing' 
that if I kill you, then you lose only your life that you would have had 
by virtue of my aid. There are, however, some killings of which this 
is true. Kamm discusses cases inspired by Judith Thomson in which 
you awaken to discover that you have been attached to somebody else 
in order to serve as his human life-support device. If you stab this 
person because this is necessary to terminate your service as his life- 
support machine, you kill him. Here the life of which you deprive 
him is not one he would have had without your aid. If, on the other 
hand, you are able simply to disconnect yourself from this person, 
then, in so doing, you let him die. Some would argue that stabbing 
the person in this case is morally on a par with disconnecting yourself 
from him. Even if we grant this claim, Kamm argues that we cannot 
draw any general lesson about the moral parity of killing and letting 
die from this pair of cases. She argues that this type of comparison is 
ill-suited as a "test" of the moral equivalence of killing versus letting 
die because it masks a genuine conceptual difference between killing 
and letting die by affixing a property that is true by definition of the 
one (but not the other) onto the other. Kamm maintains that a better 
test of moral equivalence would be one in which we compare a killing 
(or letting die) that contingently possesses a property that is true by 
definition of a letting die (or killing) with a killing (or letting die) that 
does not possess this property (but is otherwise identical). If we detect 
a difference in the moral significance of these cases, then we have 
evidence that a "definitional property" that distinguishes killing from 
letting die is morally significant and hence that killing is not morally 
equivalent to letting die. 
Employing methodology inspired by the above remarks, Kamm 
argues that killings that lack the definitional property of letting die 
identified above (that of your losing only a life that you would have 
1. Earlier discussion of this problem can be found in Kamm's "Killing and Letting 
Die: Methodology and Substance," Paific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (1983): 297-312, 
and "Harming, Not Aiding, and Positive Rights," Philosophy and Public Affairs 15 
(1986): 3-32. 
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had by virtue of my aid) are morally worse than otherwise identical 
killings that possess this property. She then notes that we can conclude 
that killing is worse than letting die if the following two plausible 
claims are also true: (1) no definitional properties make letting die 
worse than killing, and (2) the above definitional property of letting 
die does not function any differently when affixed to killings than it 
does on its "home ground" in the context of lettings die.2 
Part 1 is a tour de force that sets a new standard for discussion 
of the topic of killing and letting die. Her treatment of methodological 
issues concerning the employment of cases in thought experiments is 
especially illuminating. Not only is she the first, I think, to have made 
the points about definitional and nondefinitional properties and about 
the interaction of properties with context, she has also developed these 
points and others with great insight and sophistication. 
Kamm's argument for moral inequivalence is not, however, be- 
yond criticism. She appears to stack the deck in arguing for a crucial 
premise of that argument-the premise that it is less bad for someone 
to be killed if he is dependent upon the killer's aid for life than it is 
for someone to be killed if he is not dependent upon any aid from 
the killer. In defending this premise, Kamm primarily relies on com- 
parisons involving cases such as the one described above in which the 
dependent person receives aid as the result of some physical imposition 
upon the unwilling benefactor's body. (This beneficiary is not, how- 
ever, in any way to blame for this physical imposition.) These cases 
are problematic as tests of the moral significance of dependence. For 
the intuition that it is less bad to kill the dependent than the nondepen- 
dent person might be explained by a belief that the physical imposition 
upon the benefactor deprives the beneficiary of any moral claim to 
the benefit rather than by belief in the moral significance of the mere 
fact that the dependent person loses only life that he would have had 
as a result of the killer's aid. A better test for the moral significance 
of the property of depriving someone of only life that he would have 
had as the result of one's aid would be a comparison involving a case 
that is similar to Kamm's except for the fact that the benefactor has 
not been physically imposed upon. 
Consider, for example, the following case. Somebody is dying 
from a poison that has the following curious side effect: so long as 
this person is suffering from the poison, the vapors from his breath 
contain a gas, the inhaling of which will cure a nearby person who is 
suffering from a life-threatening ailment of a different sort. The poi- 
2. Kamm was, I believe, the first to alert philosophers engaged in moral casuistry 
to the possibility that (2) might be false, since a property can have an effect in one 
context that it does not have in another context. She first discussed this possibility of 
"contextual interaction" in "Killing and Letting Die." 
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soned person has no duty to provide the aid that the vapors from his 
breath produce. If an antidote to his poison were available, he would 
violate no duty to aid the dependent person if he were to ingest this 
antidote. (Let us assume that the antidote will work only if it takes effect 
before he has exhaled enough of the gas to cure the dependent person.) 
Nevertheless, the dependent person is perfectly entitled to the benefit 
of breathing whatever vapors the poisoned person happens to exhale. 
Now imagine that the poisoned person will live only if he shoots either 
the dependent person or some third party who does not depend on him 
for his life. (Assume that the dependent person will breath enough of 
the vapors to be cured even if the third party is shot.) It is, I think, a 
good deal less clear in this case than in Kamm's cases involving physical 
imposition that the fact that the one person depends on the poisoned 
person for life makes it any less objectionable to shoot him rather than 
a nondependent person. Hence, it is not clear that Kamm's comparisons 
demonstrate the moral significance of mere dependence. 
II. THE TROLLEY PROBLEM 
In part 2, Kamm formulates a Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH) 
that is supposed to conform to and justify our intuitive judgments of 
when it is and is not permissible to harm some individuals in cases 
where such harm is necessary if one is to save a greater number from 
harm.3 The PPH is offered as a solution to Philippa Foot's much- 
discussed "Trolley Problem"-the problem of explaining why, on the 
one hand, it is permissible to divert a runaway trolley car onto a side 
track where it will run over one in order to prevent it from running 
over five on the main track even though, on the other hand, it is 
impermissible to kill a healthy individual and remove five vital organs 
in order to save the lives of five in need of organ transplants.4 In its 
unqualified form, the PPH is fairly elaborate, as it must be if it is to be 
beyond range of the arsenal of counterexamples at Kamm's disposal. 
Roughly speaking, the PPH states that it is permissible to harm some 
when necessary to save more just in case the harm is an effect or aspect 
of the greater good itself that one produces. One may do (greater) 
good even though (lesser) harm will come of it. One may not, on the 
other hand, do harm in order that good will come of it (as a causal 
effect of the event that is harmful). The PPH explains why we may 
divert the trolley from the five to the one: the killing of the one is an 
effect of the diverting of the trolley, where this diversion is, according 
to Kamm, the greater good itself, since it is the saving of the five. The 
3. Much of the material in these chapters is a revision of Kamm's article "Harming 
Some to Save Others," Philosophical Studies 57 (1989): 227-60. 
4. Philippa Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect," 
Oxford Review, no. 5 (1967), pp. 5-15. 
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.48 on Thu, 14 Nov 2013 06:29:33 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Otsuka Review of Kamm 201 
PPH explains why we may not transplant from the one to the five: in 
this case, the killing of the one through the removal of his organs is 
not itself a good thing, but rather a harmful event that is a means of 
causing the greater good of the saving of the five from organ failure. 
Kamm also believes that one is not permitted to do harm in order 
that good will come of the harmful event even if the harm is merely 
foreseen rather than intended. She maintains, for example, that one 
is not permitted to throw a grenade at a trolley in order to destroy it 
before it runs over five if one foresees that the shrapnel from the 
grenade will kill an innocent bystander. 
Kamm clearly advances the literature on the Trolley Problem and 
the issues of more general importance that this problem raises. Her 
counterexamples to the solutions to this problem that others have 
proposed are often ingenious and imaginative, and at times devasta- 
ting. Her own positive proposal-the PPH-is interesting, original, 
and fairly plausible. I do not, however, believe that Kamm has pro- 
vided enough of an explanation of what, beyond fit with her intuitions 
about trolley cases, motivates her claim that there is a moral distinction 
between harm that is an effect or aspect of a causal means to the 
greater good and harm that is an effect or aspect of the greater good 
itself. Even when judged simply by the standard of fit with intuition, 
I don't think the PPH is an unqualified success. Imagine, for example, 
that the only way to save five from suffocation who are pinned under- 
neath a boulder is to lift the boulder off the five but up against a sixth 
who will thereby be crushed to death. Such removal is permitted by 
the PPH, since the lesser harm is the result of the greater good of the 
removal of the boulder itself. Now imagine that the only way to save 
five who are pinned underneath a boulder is to remove the boulder 
with a bulldozer where you foresee that the moving of the bulldozer 
into the vicinity of the boulder will set off a rock slide that will kill a 
sixth. Here the saving of the five is prohibited by the PPH, since the 
causal means to the greater good results in a lesser harm. Yet removal 
of the boulder by the prohibited method strikes me as intuitively no 
less justifiable than its removal by the permissible method. 
III. THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEONTOLOGICAL 
CONSTRAINTS 
Part 3 is devoted primarily to a defense of deontological constraints 
against killing. Deontologists place a number of restrictions on the 
sort of harms one may permissibly inflict on another. Kamm's PPH 
(as discussed in Sec. II above), for example, places restrictions on the 
permissibility of killing someone even when doing so will prevent a 
greater number from being killed. Not only are we sometimes prohib- 
ited from killing one in order to prevent others from being killed, but 
there are even circumstances in which we may not violate someone's 
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right not to be killed in order to prevent more of the very same type 
of right not to be killed from being violated. (Imagine that somebody 
has maliciously sent a trolley car toward five with the intention of 
killing them. I can stop this trolley, but only by pushing an innocent 
bystander into its path. It is wrong to kill the bystander even to prevent 
the murder of five.) In Kamm's terminology, a deontological constraint 
against killing exists just in case it is impermissible to kill in order to 
prevent more impermissible killings from occurring.5 
Deontological constraints are notoriously hard to justify, since, as 
Robert Nozick has noted, it appears irrational that one be prohibited 
from violating a constraint when such violation will prevent more of the 
very same type of constraint from being violated.6 Some have attempted 
to justify constraints by appealing to the distinction between what one 
does and what one allows to happen. Bernard Williams, among others, 
has argued that one has a special responsibility for actions that flow from 
one's agency that one does not have for the actions of others, and that 
this is why it could be wrong to kill somebody rather than allow another 
to kill more.7 Thomas Nagel, among others, has made a similar point 
that distinguishes between harm that one intentionally commits and 
harm that one merely foresees that others will commit.8 Kamm rejects 
this sort of "agent-relative" justification of constraints that focuses on 
certain facts about the agent who would violate the constraint. She dem- 
onstrates, through thought experiments, that it is just as impermissible 
to murder one in order to prevent oneself from being the murderer of 
more as it is to murder one in order to prevent another from being the 
murderer of more. (Imagine a variation of the above trolley case in which 
you are the one who has sent the trolley toward the five and now you 
can prevent yourself from being the murderer of the five only by pushing 
an innocent bystander into its path. It seems no less wrong to push the 
one in this case than in the previous case.)9 
Kamm's own justification of constraints focuses on facts about the 
status of the potential victims of rights violations rather than facts 
5. Deontological constraints are a subset of deontological restrictions. A deontologi- 
cal restriction against killing also exists when it is impermissible to kill to prevent more 
killings (or deaths) that are not themselves impermissible (e.g., when it is impermissible 
to kill one in order to prevent a natural disaster from killing more) and when it is 
impermissible to kill to maximize the sum total of human happiness (whether or not 
through the prevention of more killings or deaths). 
6. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 30. 
7. Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism," in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard 
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
pp. 93-100. 
8. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), pp. 175-80. 
9. Kamm was one of the first to make this point in an earlier version of this chapter 
that she presented at an American Philosophical Association meeting in 1983. 
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about the agent who would-violate the constraint. Her view is that 
constraints are justified because they reflect our elevated moral status 
as persons who are inviolable insofar as it is impermissible to sacrifice 
any one of us in order to realize the greater good of minimizing the 
violation of constraints. Our moral status as inviolable beings is greater 
than it would have been if it were legitimate to sacrifice any one of us 
for the sake of minimizing evil. Kamm emphasizes that the impermissibil- 
ity of violating one person's constraint for the sake of preventing more 
of the same type of constraint from being violated does not imply the 
permissibility of the constraint violations that one is not permitted to 
prevent. Hence, even if we are, statistically speaking, more likely to be 
killed as a means when there are constraints against minimizing con- 
straint violations, we are, morally speaking, less violable insofar as there 
are fewer constraints that it is permissible to violate.'0 
Kamm raises the interesting question of whether it is permissible 
to alienate one's right not to have one's constraint against being killed 
violated in the future. It might seem rational for all to alienate such 
a right if everyone has the same chance of being the victim of a 
constraint violation. To illustrate this possibility, Kamm presents the 
following example: "All six of us have eaten dinner. We discover that 
five dishes of soup were lethally poisoned, and one had an antidote 
in it. We do not know who ate what, and will find out only in an hour 
when the symptoms appear. We do know that using the organs of the 
one who ate the antidote is the only way to make a serum to save the 
other five."" It seems rational here for each of us to agree to be 
sacrificed if he should turn out to be the one who has eaten the 
antidote, provided that everyone else enters into the same agreement. 
Whether or not such agreement is rational, Kamm insists that it is 
impermissible on the ground that our status as inviolable individuals 
would be diminished if we were to alienate our right not to be sacrificed 
in exchange for an increase in our chance for survival. She suggests 
that the status that would be diminished is that of persons who are 
"ends-in-themselves" who are "not to be used as mere means for 
achieving the good of others."'12 
Part 3 contains much of Kamm's most ambitious and interesting 
work. Herjustification of deontological constraints is probably, to date, 
10. Earlier articulations of these points can be found in the following works: Kamm, 
"Harming Some to Save Others," "Non-consequentialism, the Person as an End-in- 
Itself, and the Significance of Status," Philosophy and Public Affairs 21 (1992): 354-89, 
and her discussion piece titled "Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality," Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 903 - 7. 
11. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, p. 291. (She gives Douglas Husak credit for this 
example.) 
12. Ibid., p. 295. 
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her most important contribution to moral philosophy. The basic idea 
is so simple and intuitive that it seems almost obvious. Nevertheless, 
it is an insight that managed to elude many outstanding philosophers 
who had previously devoted considerable effort to trying to determine 
whether deontological constraints are justifiable. 
One reservation I have with Kamm's justification of constraints 
is that she leaves hanging, without saying enough to rebut, a serious 
objection to her argument that Shelly Kagan has raised.'3 The objec- 
tion is as follows. Increased inviolability is a double-edged sword: it is 
bought at the expense of a decrease in "saveability." As our inviolability 
goes up, our moral status increases insofar as less may be done to each 
of us for the greater good of others. But it decreases insofar as less 
may be done to others in order to save each of us from being violated. 
Saveability, like inviolability, is surely an important indication of moral 
status. For Kamm's argument for constraints to succeed, she must be 
able to show that the increase in inviolability more than outweighs the 
decrease in saveability. 
I would also like to report the following puzzle to which Kamm's 
justification of constraints gives rise. According to her, our status as 
inviolable beings stems from "certain properties (here not enumer- 
ated) that we possess as individuals."'4 She speculates that these prop- 
erties have to do with our rational capacities-"that we are rational 
beings," "creatures who act for reasons,"'5 or beings that have "a 
rational will, whose consent we must seek when interfering with what 
[such] a person has independently of imposition on us."16 She also 
notes that human beings are not as inviolable as they could possibly 
be. We would, for example, be more inviolable if our right not to be 
foreseeably killed (as in the trolley case), or our right not to be killed 
in self-defense, were as stringent as our right not to be sacrificed for 
the greater good (as in the transplant case). We would be as inviolable 
as we could conceivably be just in case it were never for any reason 
and under any circumstances permissible to kill or harm any one of 
us. My puzzlement arises from the fact that it does not appear that 
beings whose rational capacities (or capacities for fellow-feeling or 
artistic creativity, for that matter) were far greater than ours (but who 
were otherwise as vulnerable to death and harm as we) would be more 
inviolable than we in the respect that is relevant to Kamm'sjustification 
of constraints. Beings far more rational, sympathetic, or creative than 
we might be more inviolable in the following irrelevant respect: if 
some impartial outsider were forced to kill either one of us or one of 
13. Shelly Kagan, "Replies to My Critics," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
51 (1991): 919-20. 
14. Kamm, Morality, Mortality, p. 273. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Ibid., pp. 276-77. 
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them, it might be justifiable to kill one of us (just as it would be 
justifiable for an impartial outsider to kill a deer rather than one of 
us if forced to kill either one or the other). But I doubt that they 
would be more inviolable than we in the following relevant respect. I 
doubt that it would be impermissible to turn a trolley onto one of 
them if necessary to save five (or even two) of them from being killed, 
or that the moral barrier against involuntarily transplanting vital or- 
gans from one of them to save the lives of many of them would be 
greater than in the case of human beings. As far as I can tell, the 
moral principles and rules that apply to human beings would also apply 
to these superhuman beings. We, on the other hand, are arguably more 
inviolable in the relevant respect than beings with capacities inferior 
to ours. It is, for example, probably permissible, in some circum- 
stances, to kill a minority of the deer in a given overpopulated herd 
in order to spare the majority from death by starvation, even though 
it would not be permissible, in analogous circumstances, to kill a minor- 
ity of human beings in a given overpopulated society in order to spare 
the majority from death by starvation. If these observations are correct, 
then increases in inviolability track increases in rational (and other) 
capacities only up to a point-roughly that point in the evolution of 
capacities that human beings have reached. (As noted above, this point 
is not, however, the point at which inviolability is as great as it could 
possibly be.) But this would be an odd result. Why doesn't inviolability 
continue to track these capacities? And why are we so fortunate to 
have reached the actual limit point of inviolability? 
Another reservation with Kamm's justification of constraints is 
that it fails to explain the full range of cases in which deontologists 
believe that constraints apply. It does not provide a justification for 
constraints where that which one is constrained from minimizing is 
something other than the victimization of persons. Many deontologists 
would, for example, insist that one should not let one student whom 
one has caught cheating go unpunished even if this is a necessary 
means to get him to reveal information that would enable one to catch 
five cheaters who would otherwise go unpunished. Such a constraint 
against letting a guilty person go unpunished cannot, however, be 
justified on the grounds that persons are more inviolable with it than 
without it. I suspect that there is a unifying account that explains why 
we are constrained from minimizing in this case as well as in the cases 
of killing and harming innocents that Kamm considers. In all these 
cases we recoil at the prospect of "doing evil that good may come of 
it." It does not seem to make much difference whether the evil that 
is employed as a means to the greater good is that of victimizing an 
innocent person or letting a guilty person go unpunished. 
Finally, I disagree with Kamm's claim that we would not be per- 
mitted to alienate our constraint in the soup case. The question of 
permissibility should be divided into two: First, should one have a 
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(moral) right to alienate one's right not to be sacrificed? And second, 
even if one had such a right, might it nevertheless be wrong to exercise 
this right? The latter question presupposes the conceptual possibility 
of a right to do wrong. Such a right should be understood as one that 
offers a person the following moral immunity: others have a duty to 
refrain from forcibly interfering with her exercise of this right even 
though such interference would prevent her from doing that which 
she should not do. 
I do not believe that any good rationale can be supplied for the 
denial of a right to alienate one's right not to be sacrificed. I do not 
believe, for example, that one can justify the inalienability of this right 
on the ground that those who have the right to alienate this right have 
a lesser moral status than those who do not. It is not hard to imagine 
that one's moral status might be reduced if one were to exercise one's 
right to alienate this right. But it is difficult to see how one's status 
could be reduced merely by having the right to alienate this right. 
(Consider the following analogy. A king's status might diminish if he 
abdicates the throne. But the mere possession of the right to abdicate 
does not diminish his status. He would not have been a more venerable 
king if he did not have the power to abdicate.) If anything, having 
the right to alienate this right enhances one's status, since it endows 
one with a power to bind oneself in the future in a manner that others 
must respect through noninterference. This power is by no means 
trivial, since it would give one the right dramatically to increase one's 
chances of survival in cases such as the soup case. In this respect, it 
is analogous to the power that one gains by having the sort of right 
that Ulysses had to ensure that he remain bound to the mast. On the 
other hand, deprivation of one's right to alienate this right strikes me 
as a paternalistic curtailment of one's autonomy.'7 
Perhaps it is not the mere right to alienate one's right not to be 
sacrificed that is thought to diminish one's moral status, but rather 
the exercise of this right. There are many cases in which the exercise, 
but not the possession, of a right is morally degrading. We each have 
the moral right, for example, to exchange sex with a willing party for 
room and board in that person's private home. The mere fact that 
one possesses this right is not degrading, yet it may be wrong to enter 
into such an agreement because it is degrading to both parties. Would 
it be morally degrading to enter into the agreement contemplated in 
the soup case? I do not believe that it would. I do not think that there 
17. It is a separate question whether one is always better off with this power. In 
an interesting article, David Velleman has argued that one might be better off without 
the power to waive one's right not to be killed in much the same way as a convenience 
store clerk is better off without the power to open the safe at night. (See Velleman's 
"Against the Right to Die," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 [1992]: 665-81.) 
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would be anything humiliating, exploitative, or otherwise objection- 
able about such an agreement. Rather, it would be an example of 
nothing more than the rational taking of risks by equally situated 
individuals where the expected gain in something that is objectively 
good (survival) outweighs the expected losses. 
I wonder, in any event, whether Kamm needs to defend the claim 
that constraints may not be alienated in order to vindicate her defense 
of constraints. I grant that it would be an embarrassment for Kamm 
if such alienating were permissible, and it would in fact be irrational 
for us to refuse to agree to alienate all constraints against being sacri- 
ficed in the future. But I do not think this would be irrational. In the 
soup case, it might well be irrational not to enter into the agreement, 
since the expected benefit is so great: that of reducing one's chance 
of being killed from five in six to one in six. It does not follow, however, 
that it would be irrational not to enter into an agreement to alienate 
all constraints. It might not be irrational even if everybody shares the 
same chances of being the victim and the beneficiary of constraint 
violations. We do, after all, diminish something of importance when 
we alienate all constraints: our status as beings whom it is not legitimate 
to sacrifice. Moreover, I doubt that what we would gain from collec- 
tively alienating all constraints would in fact be nearly so dramatic as 
the reduction in the chance of being killed from five in six to one 
in six.18 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In summary, Kamm's book is a brilliant and powerful defense of the 
deontological perspective concerning the morality of killing. It is argu- 
ably the most impressive book-length treatment of substantive ethics 
since Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons was published over a decade 
ago. Like Parfit, she often presents familiar problems in startling new 
light. Like Parfit, her painstakingly meticulous case method yields a 
wealth of important insights. Unlike Parfit, her conclusions are deonto- 
logical rather than consequentialist. Hence, in my opinion, Kamm has 
the additional virtue of truth on her side. 
18. It is worth noting that the ex ante advantage of alienating one's right in the 
soup case is probably much greater than the ex ante advantage of agreeing to an "emer- 
gency escape clause" on constraints that many deontologists would accept-one which 
would allow the killing of a small number of people in order to prevent some huge 
number greater than a million from being killed. For the likelihood that one will ever 
be among a million or more people whose lives can be spared by killing a small number 
of people is exceedingly remote. 
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